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Abstract
This paper develops a mathematical model that describes how
a controlled user of an illicit drug might respond to various
punishment policies. As defined here, a punishment policy specifies
the expected cost of being arrested as a function of the quantity
possessed.
It is shown that a "zero-tolerance" policy that assigns the same
high level of punishment regardless of the quantity possessed may
not minimize consumption. The set of policies that would minimize
consumption is described. Because these policies may not be
politically feasible, the consumption minimizing policy within a
restricted class of politically plausible policies is also derived.
Comparing these and two other policies suggests that reforming
statutes to make the punishment increase as the quantity possessed
increases may be desirable.
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1.0 Introduction
One often hears proposals to "get tough" on drugs by imposing
stiff sanctions for possession of even small amounts that are suitable
only for personal consumption. Such "zero tolerance" policies have
been criticized because they oblige enforcement agencies to allocate
scarce resources to relatively less important offenders and because
they violate the principle that "the punishment should fit the crime".
This paper argues that, in addition, a tough "zero tolerance" policy
that assigns all users the same stiff sanction regardless of the
quantity possessed may actually encourage some users to increase
consumption.
The reason for this counterintuitive behavior is that a
significant fraction of the cost a drug user incurs is the cost of
identifying and meeting with a supplier (search time costs). Roughly
speaking this cost is proportional to the frequency with which the
user buys. Since every time a user buys, he or she incurs some risk
of being arrested, a zero tolerance policy gives the user the incentive
to buy large quantities relatively infrequently2 . This reduces search
time costs which could make the user willing to incur a greater dollar
cost, i.e. to buy more drugs.
This paper develops a model which makes this argument
precise, but it is helpful to understand the fundamental dynamics
before plunging into the mathematical details. With this in mind, the
following paragraphs informally rephrase the argument using three
different metaphors.
The first is the adage, "In for a penny, in for a pound". When
punishment for possession does not increase with quantity, this may
be good advice. Presumably the user derives some benefit from
consuming the drug, and if drugs are like most consumer products
"more is better". So, if the (punishment) costs are the same whether
the user buys a lot or a little, why not buy a lot?
Another perspective comes from comparing the individual's
decision about how much to consume to a firm's decision about how
much to produce. A firm derives revenue by selling goods produced
by employing a variety of factors. Likewise, the individual derives
satisfaction by consuming drugs purchased by incurring a variety of
costs. Firms maximize profit when marginal revenue equals
1This paper uses informal terms when the benefits of being concise seem to
outweigh the dangers of not being precise.
2 Assuming, as is generally the case, that most arrests of users occur during
activity related to obtaining the drugs, not because they have it in their
possession at some other time.
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marginal cost. Likewise, the individual maximizes utility when the
marginal benefit of consuming equals the marginal cost of acquiring
the drugs.
Changing punishment from an increasing function to a constant
independent of the quantity consumed is like converting one of the
firm's variable costs to a fixed cost. If the fixed cost is sufficiently
high, the firm will cease production, but if it is profitable to produce
at all, the profit maximizing quantity is determined by setting
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. Once the decision to
produce has been made, fixed costs are sunk costs and do not affect
the optimal production level.
Similarly, if punishment is constant for all (positive) quantities,
once the individual has decided to use drugs, the level of punishment
has no effect on the optimal amount of consumption 1. Assuming that
"more is better" and there are diminishing returns to consumption,
reducing the marginal cost of using will increase the utility
maximizing amount of consumption.
The third metaphor also compares the drug user to a firm. For
a firm, when the price of an input increases the optimal mix of factor
inputs changes. For example, if wages increase the firm may
substitute capital for labor. Production will be lower, but depending
on the relative magnitudes of the income and substitution effects, the
amount of capital consumed may increase.
The user "produces" a net utility equal to the satisfaction
derived from using minus the costs. If the cost of making frequent
purchases increases, the user may substitute total quantity for
frequency of purchase by increasing the size of each purchase. The
user's net utility declines, but the total amount consumed may
increase if the substitution effect is greater than the income effect.
Hopefully these comparisons have given some intuition for the
argument explored in this paper, but they should not be taken too
literally. Drug consumption is determined by two interdependent
variables: the purchase size and the frequency of purchase, both of
which affect the total punishment cost. Hence the response to a
change in punishment policy is not as simple as these comparisons
suggest and formalizing the argument with a mathematical model
may be useful.
1Actually this overstates the case. As will be seen, at least in the model
developed below, the level of punishment still affects consumption even if it
does not depend on the quantity possessed at the time of arrest. The effect can,
however, be smaller than it would be if punishment increased with the
quantity possessed.
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2.0 The Basic Model
2.1 Formulation
Mathematical models are inevitably simplifications. Ideally the
simplifications make it possible to draw interesting conclusions
without so distorting the fundamental nature of the system modelled
that the conclusion are erroneous. This section describes the
modelling framework used and its underlying assumptions. The
assumptions overlook much of the complexity of and uncertainty
about the behavior of drug users, but it is hoped that the reader will
find that they capture at least most of the first order effects.
A fundamental assumption of the modelling framework used is
that drug users maximize their utility. To some it may sound
ludicrous to build a model whose foundation rests on the rationality
of drug users. After all, their decision to use drugs casts doubt on
their foresight and their very use may cloud whatever judgement
they had originally. Such a view, though commonly held, is not
necessarily entirely accurate.
The fact that someone has decided to use drugs is not prima
facie evidence that they are irrational or masochistic. Using drugs
involves risks and costs, but so do most activities, and drug use is
reported to bring a variety of benefits including, but not necessarily
limited to, euphoria, escape, and acceptance in some social groups1.
It is also not true that those who have begun using drugs are
incapable of acting rationally 2. First of all, few if any users are
continuously "high". Even "hard core heroin addicts" come down
between highs, and many if not most of their purchase decisions are
probably made at these times. Secondly, many drug users, including
some known as "chippers" who have used for an extended time on a
regular basis, lead a "normal" life, pursuing a career, raising a family,
and maintaining a circle of friends. Nevertheless, reluctance to
describe a heavily "addicted" user as someone who rationally acts in
their own self-interest is only reasonable.
1
"Usually the rush [of heroin] is described as a violent, orgasmic experience,
somewhat like a sexual orgasm, "only vastly more so."", John Kaplan, The
Hardest Drug: Heroin and Public Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1983), p.22 .
2 0n the contrary, the general impression one receives from reading studies
such as Johnson et al.'s Taking Care of Business: The Economics of Crime by
Heroin Abusers (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985) is that even dependent
users behave purposefully and thoughtfully if one remembers that their
environment and objectives are not the same as those of the general public.
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Hence, from the outset this model will be restricted to
"controlled users". Tautologically this restriction excludes all users
whose behavior is inconsistent with one or more of the models'
assumptions. For example, it excludes those who do not rationally
maximize their individual welfare. It is up to the reader to decide
whether this restriction makes the model applicable to such a small
fraction of the population that its conclusions are of no value.
Besides restricting attention to controlled users, the model
focuses on users whose consumption is in "steady state". It does not
apply to novice users, people whose consumption varies greatly over
relatively short periods, or people who "binge". The reason for this is
simple; modeling the evolution of behavior is complex. This paper
only tries to describe what the ultimate changes might be by
examining behavior before and after some exogenous change. In
economists' lexicon, it is a comparative statics analysis.
Furthermore, as a considerable simplification, it will be
assumed that the user buys a particular quantity at regular intervals.
Without this assumption the analysis below would be considerably
more complicated. With it, there are just two decision variables over
which the user maximizes his or her utility:
q = the quantity purchased each time the user buys, and
f = the frequency with which the user buys.
Purchasing and using drugs offers a variety of advantages and
disadvantages. It will be assumed that these can all -be converted
into some measure of utility, so the user's decision can be described
as an optimization problem:
Max z(f,q) = B(f,q) - C(f,q)
s.t. q,f 0
where
B(f,q) = benefit per unit time the user derives from receiving q units
of drugs with frequency f, and
C(f,q) = cost per unit time of purchasing q unit batches of drugs with
frequency f.
There may be constraints on q and f other than that they be
nonnegative. Obviously there is a minimum purchase size suppliers
will sell and the frequency of purchase cannot be arbitrarily large or
arbitrarily close to zero. Perhaps more significantly, the purchase
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size q may be limited by the amount of cash the user has'. It is
assumed that this cash constraint is not binding. For many controlled
users this is reasonable. Others may be able to borrow enough to
make the desired purchase, and the borrowing costs can be counted
as holding costs (discussed below). The problem can also be solved
assuming the cash constraint is binding. Generally speaking, if the
cash constraint is binding the user will buy as much as he or she can
afford as often as possible, and the punishment policy does not affect
consumption.
Limited income and wealth also threaten the steady state
assumption. One might purchase a fixed quantity q with a fixed
frequency f for quite some time, but not be in financial steady state.
For example, such an individual might be drawing upon savings 2. In
these situations assuming an infinite horizon steady state may not be
objectively realistic, but it may approximate to the user's thinking.
There is no "correct" functional form for B(f,q) or C(f,q). After
all, even modelling the utility and disutility associated with licit
activities that can be studied more easily is imprecise. The best one
can do is make some plausible assumptions and hope that the
dynamics of the system are relatively robust. The remainder of this
subsection lists the assumptions made here.
Assumption Al. B(f,q) = a j for f, q > 0, where a is a positive
constant.
This is the most speculative of the assumptions. For a
controlled user who can maintain an inventory (i.e. one who can
resist the temptation to binge), B(f,q) is probably a function of the
quantity of drugs not f or q individually, i.e. B(f,q) = B(fq). For most
consumer goods "more is better" and there are diminishing returns to
consumption, so one would expect B(fq) to be a concave, increasing
function.
The square root function is concave and increasing, but it is by
no means the only such function. However, other functions, such as
B(fq) = (fq)e and B(fq) = ln(fq), lead to less tractable formulations. As
will be seen, if B(f,q) = c Tqg a number of results can be obtained in
closed form. Since there is no obvious reason for preferring any
other functional form and it is not feasible to measure the function
empirically, the square root function will be used.
1Some suppliers will sell on credit to familiar customers, but there are limits to
the credit they will give.
2See, for example, Andrew H. Malcolm's two part series "The Spreading Web of
Crack" in the New York Times, October 1-2, 1989, Sec. 1, p.1.
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C(f,q) includes the following costs: purchase cost, the cost of the
negative health effects of using drugs, search cost, the cost of keeping
an inventory, and the expected cost of being arrested while buying
the drugs. Quantifying these costs requires several assumptions.
Assumption A2: Purchase costs are proportional to the quantity
consumed, fq. This is equivalent to assuming that price is
independent of q and f for fixed fq.
Drug markets are certainly large enough that no single user's
purchases can significantly affect the price. If all users doubled their
purchases prices might increase, but the model focuses on an
individual user's decision. However, users who buy large quantities
can sometimes obtain quantity discounts 1. Ignoring these discounts
restricts the model to users whose consumption habits clearly place
them in the retail market irrespective of what punishment policy is
in effect.
Assumption A3: The costs of the negative health effects are
proportional to qf, the quantity consumed.
Since the user is assumed to be in sufficient control of his or
her habit to avoid binges, the costs of the negative health effects are
probably proportional to the quantity of drugs consumed, not on q or
f alone. To avoid cluttering notation, these costs are incorporated
into the purchase cost term.
Assumption A4: Search costs are proportional to f.
Search costs for the first few purchases are likely to be much
greater than for subsequent purchases, but after that initial
transient, search costs, or at least expected search costs, are probably
proportional to f for wide ranges in q. The model ignores any such
transient effects and assumes search costs are proportional to f.
Assumption A5: Inventory costs are proportional to q.
Quantities held for personal use take up so little physical space
one might think the inventory cost term would be negligible. In fact,
inventory costs are likely to be small relative to other costs, but if
they were truly zero, then it would be optimal for users to buy all
1This is described in Johnson et al. for heroin users and asserted to be true for
cocaine users by Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave in Sealing
the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug
Interdiction, The RAND Corporation, January 1988.
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they will ever use in one purchase. Clearly this is not done in
practice, so there must be disincentives to holding large inventories.
First of all, storage costs per unit weight of drugs are high relative to
those of many consumer products because most users make at least
some effort to hide them. Second, there is the risk of having the
drugs stolen or inadvertently damaged. Third, there is the
opportunity cost of holding inventory; money tied up in an inventory
of drugs is money that cannot be used elsewhere. Fourth, at some
time most users stop using drugs, and the salvage value of an unused
inventory of drugs is next to zero.
These costs are proportional to the quantity held. Suppose the
user consumes at a constant rate and replenishes whenever the stock
drops to some threshold. Then inventory as a function of time has a
sawtooth graph and the average inventory cost per unit time is a
constant, which can be ignored, plus a term proportional to q.
Assumption A6: The probability of being arrested is proportional to
f, the frequency with which purchases are made.
This assumption reflects the observation that most users who
are arrested are apprehended while buying or when they have the
drugs in their possession soon after buying. It is much less common
to be arrested while using or for possession at some other time.
If every user purchased more often, then the risk of arrest per
purchase might decrease because the ratio of police power to the
number of transactions would fall. But this model focuses on one
individual's decision, and one individual's actions will not
appreciably affect this ratio.
Factors other than the amount of police power per transaction
may have an effect. Frequenting drug copping1 areas might arouse
suspicion, so the probability of arrest per purchase may actually
increase with f. On the other hand, frequent purchasers may be
more adept at avoiding the police. Or, it is possible that frequent
purchasers may become careless. Also, infrequent purchasers may
be able to take better advantage of variations in enforcement
pressure. On the other hand, frequent purchasers may know more
about these variations. Since the relative strength of these
conflicting factors is not obvious, in this paper it will be assumed that
the probability of arrest per purchase is independent of the
frequency with which purchases are made.
1
"Copping" is a slang term used for purchasing or serving as an intermediary
between a buyer and seller.
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Assumption A7: The penalty the user expects to suffer if he or she is
arrested while buying depends on the quantity purchased.
The expected penalty to the user if he or she is arrested will be
represented by the function ca(q). To a large extent this function,
referred to in the sequel as the punishment policy, can be set by
policy makers.
It is reasonable to assume punishment depends on the quantity
possessed at arrest (especially since the constant function is not
excluded), but it may depend on other factors as well. In particular,
punishment frequently depends on the offender's prior criminal
record, including their record for drug offenses. This suggests that
during steady state periods not only consumption patterns, but also
criminal record must be constant. For example, suppose the
individual is arrested for possession of narcotics but released on
parole. The expected punishment for that individual upon a
subsequent arrest would almost certainly increase, so a new
equilibrium would be obtained.
It is possible that a dynamic purchasing strategy would be
superior. For example, it may be optimal for the purchase amount to
increase slowly as the amount of time since the most recent arrest
increases, but such possibilities are ignored. The omission of users'
criminal records is more problematic when one discusses the model's
implications for optimal punishment policies.
Having made these assumptions the cost function may be
modelled as
C(f,q) = h q + Cs f + P ca(q) f + cp qf
where
h = inventory cost coefficient,
cs = search time cost per purchase,
ca(q) = expected cost of being arrested while buying,
p = probability of being arrested while making a purchase, and
cp = purchase price.
2.2 Solution to the Basic Model With Linear Punishment
Given the assumptions above, if ca(q) is assumed to be linear
(ca(q) = a + bq for q > 0) the overall problem is
Max z(f,q) = af- -h q - (cs + p a) f- (cp+ p b) fq (P 1)
s.t. q,f 2 0.
This is a relatively straightforward nonlinear optimization
problem in two variables with nonnegativity constraints. It is solved
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in the Appendix by standard methods. Letting * denote an optimal
value, the result is that if cx < 2h (cs + pa)
z* = f* = q* = 0,
but if c > 2h(cs + p a) the optimal purchase quantity and frequency
are
q*, = c cs + a _cs + pa
2(cp+pb) h cp+pb
f* h q*= h h
cs + pa 2(cp + p b) Cs + pa c + p b
and the optimal rate of consumption and objective function value are
q* (f* - p ), and
(c- h(cs+ a))2
z(f*,q*) = (cp+pb)q*f cp =(2
Cp+p b
These expressions look more complicated than they are.
Consider, for example, the condition that if a < 2h (cs + p a) the user
is best off not purchasing or using drugs. Since oc is propotional to
the benefit derived from using, it makes sense that if a is small the
costs of using might outweigh the benefits and so q* = f* = 0.
Likewise, the holding cost parameter (h), search cost parameter (cs),
probability of arrest (p), and intercept of the punishment function (a)
are all measures of cost. The higher they are, the more likely it is
that cx is not large enough for it to be worthwhile to consume. (The
term (cp + pb) does not appear in this condition, because it is the
coefficient of a higher order term that is negligible for small q and f.)
Consider now the case when it is optimal to consume. The
optimal purchase quantity q*, frequency of purchase f*, consumption
rate q*f*, and utility z(f*,q*) are all increasing in a and are generally
decreasing in all the cost parameters, as would be expected. The
exceptions are that f* can be increasing in h, the coefficient of q in
the objective function, and q* can be increasing in (cs + pa), the
coefficient of f in the objective function. This is not surprising since
q and f are substitutes. They may be increasing or decreasing
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functions of the other's cost coefficient depending on whether the
income or substitution effect dominates1.
Note f* is proportional to q*, and the proportionality constant is
the ratio of their cost coefficients. This is because everywhere else in
the objective function q and f appear together as qf. Hence, to first
order, reducing q by 1% can be compensated for by increasing f by
q*/f* per cent, so the price of q (h) must be equal to q*/f* times the
price of f (cs + pa), i.e. f* = h q
Cs + p a
The expressions above have several policy implications. For
instance, since the punishment policy parameters a and b always
appear as pa and pb, if the probability of arrest (p) is small,
increasing the expected punishment (increasing a or b or both) will
have little effect.
In that case the policy maker may be forced to work with the
search time cost cs and purchase price cp. (a and h probably cannot
be influenced directly.) If the user is a "committed user" who
derives great satisfaction from consuming drugs, i.e. a > >
2rh (cs + p a), then increasing search time costs will not have much
effect compared with increasing prices. Increasing prices will also
reduce the consumption of a user who is "on the fence" (a =
2h(cs + pa)), but it will never push them out of the market
completely. Increasing search time costs enough to make a <
24rh(cs + pa) may, however, do exactly that.
2.3 Setting the Punishment Policy
Although enforcement policy affects price and search time
costs (and perhaps ca and h less directly), ca(q) is all that can be
controlled directly, so it is natural to ask what it should be. The
answer depends, of course, on one's objectives. This paper will
assume the objective is to minimize the rate of consumption (q*f*)
which, if price is constant, is also proportional to the drug dealers'
revenues.
From the solution above, if a < 2h(cs + pa) q* = f* = 0.
Rearranging this expression shows that if a a Ž (4-cs, q*= = O for
1The substitution effect dominates and thus q* and f* are increasing in the
other's cost parameter if the user is a heavy user, more specifically, if a >
4h (C + a).
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c + pa
any b. Similarly, if a > 2h(cs + pa), q*f* = cp + b ) so for
any given a, q* and f* can be made arbitrarily small by choosing b
large enough. In other words, according to this simple model, if the
expected punishment (not just the threatened punishment) were
made sufficiently severe, drug consumption could be eliminated.
There are limits, however, to the severity of punishment that
society will tolerate1 . Let ca be the maximum punishment for a drug
user that society will tolerate2 . Then the constraint ca(q) < ca should
be added to the formulation. Society's sense of justice would
probably also demand that ca(q) be a nondecreasing function of q
and ca(O) = 0.
3.0 Evaluating Various Punishment Policies
3.1 Policy of Maximum Punishment
One might think that imposing the harshest possible penalties
(ca(q) = ca for all q > 0) would minimize consumption. With such a
maximum punishment policy
C(f,q) = h q + c f + p Ca f+ cp qf
and the user's optimization problem is
Max z(f,q) = Acd' - h q - (cs + p ca) f- cp fq
s.t. q,f 2 0.
This is the special case of Problem P1 with a = ca and b = 0.
The solution can be found by substituting those values into the
expressions in Section 2.2. Capital letters will be used to denote the
optimal solution under a maximum punishment policy.
If aX < 2h (cs + P a) then
F = Q = 0,
but if x > 2 h(cs + pca), the optimal purchase quantity and
frequency are
lit is unlikely, for example, that the death penalty (imposed by slow
immersion in boiling oil) will ever be instituted for the possession of trace
amounts of marijuana.
2 ca can be drug specific if the model is interpreted as applying to just one drug
and substitution is ignored.
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Q . CS + P Ca _ Cs + PCa
2cp h Cp
F = h Q= a h
Cs + P Ca 2Cp Cs + Ca Cp
and the optimal rate of consumption and objective function value are
- h(cs + p Ca2
QF= ( Cp, and
( _ /h(cs + pca)
z(F,Q; ca(q)= Ca) = cp Q F = Cp
3.2 A Policy That Leads to Less
Surprisingly, this maximum
minimize consumption. This section
will be lower if the expected cost of
with q from 0 to ca for 0 < q Q and
Figure 1.) i.e.,
Ca
ca(q)= Q q for O q
ca(q) > Ca forq C
Consumption
punishment policy does not
shows the rate of consumption
being arrested increases linearly
is no less than ca for q > Q (See
< Q, and
Figure 1
A Linear Punishment Policy
C
B
A
Q q
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Ca(C
Ca
The exact form of ca(q) for q > Q does not matter. To see this,
look again at Figure 1. The previous section showed the user prefers
point A to any point on the line (A,B). But increasing the punishment
cannot improve the user's utility, so the user will prefer any point on
(A,B) to the corresponding point on (A,C) directly above. Since A is
feasible under the new policy, this means the user will never pick
any point on (A,C), i.e. q* < Q.
More formally, let z(f, q; qCa) denote the user's utility function
with this punishment policy. For all f and all q Q, z(f, q; -q) < z(f, q;
Ca(q) = Ca) < z(F, Q; Ca(q) = Ca) = z(F, Q; q). This implies there is an
optimal solution with q* < Q.
Thus the exact form of ca(q) for q > Q is irrelevant1 . In
particular, the same solution will be obtained if ca(q) = q for all q >Q
0. This is the special case of Problem P1 with a = 0 and b = Ca so theQ
solution can be obtained by substituting these values into the
expressions in Section 2.2. Let - denote quantities that are optimal
with this punishment policy. If cx < 2h 7c then
= f = 0,
but if c > 2-hcs the solution is
2{Cp + P Ca cp Ca
cQ Q 
2(c+ ) hh
2 Cp +xC C_ hC
QQ
, and
1The value of ca(q) for q > Q will not affect the user because the user will
never possess a quantity q > Q.
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q f 
z(f,q; q) = cp + Pca)2f= ( §)q)~ Q= Cp + CaQ
Individuals with 2 hcs < a < 2h(cs + pca) consume a positive
quantity under this punishment policy but not under a policy of
maximum punishment. This suggests that switching from a
maximum punishment policy to this policy might increase the
number of users. This is to be expected because curious people are
more likely to experiment if they know they will not be punished as
severely as heavy users.
If a > 2/h (cs + p Ca), however, switching from a maximum
punishment policy has a very different result. In that case the
average amount purchased' is smaller with the linear punishment
policy since
Q _ q = a Q (Cs + pc a - ) > 0.
2 /h' (cpQ + p ca)
Also, it must be the case that the user is better off because he
or she could have q = Q, f = F, and risk the same punishment as with
the maximum punishment policy. Since the previous solution is
feasible and the user maximizes utility, the new optimal solution's
utility must be at least as great. In symbols,
z(f, q; Ca) > z(F, Q; Ca = z(F, Q; ca(q) = Ca).
Actually the inequality is strict because
z(f, 4; a) - z(F, Q; ca(q) = ca)
c(-- h(cs+Ca)) ( Cs + pCa )2 0.
Cp(CpQ + p Ca) 2 2
Also, the user will buy more frequently since
aF - h(cs+pca) ,cs+pc ) / h a
-F 2 - 1= + >0.
2 cp(cpQ + C Ca Cs s + PCa
Surprisingly, the size of the average purchase decreases enough
to more than counteract the increased frequency with which
purchases are made, so the overall rate of consumption decreases by
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QF -
(cpQ )2
(2 cp (cpQ +
i (fiQ- )(2- ) c 2
P ca i A -2 C h) - (c -2 f CS > 0.
- - I
Figure 2 shows these changes in the q-f plane.
Figure 2
Changing from Maximum Punishment
to a Linear Policy
F f
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q
Q
3.3 Consumption Minimizing Policy
The previous section showed that a maximum punishment
policy need not minimize consumption. A natural question to ask is,
what punishment policy will minimize consumption?
This question can also be posed as an optimization problem, but
now the argument of the minimization is the function ca(q). That is,
the decision maker specifies an entire function, not just a finite
number of variables.
Not every function is feasible because the punishment policy
must be consistent with society's sense of justice. Specifically, it
seems reasonable to restrict attention to policies that do not punish
people who do not have any drugs (ca(O) = 0), that never threaten
more than the maximum permissible punishment (ca(q) < ca), and
that punish people possessing large quantities at least as severely as
those carrying smaller amounts (ca(q) is nondecreasing).
The policy maker would like to find the punishment policy
Ca(q) satisfying these constraints that minimizes the rate of
consumption, qf. But q and f both depend on the punishment policy.
They are determined when the user maximizes his or her utility, and
as the preceding discussion showed, the user's optimal purchasing
pattern is affected by the punishment policy.
Mathematically this can be represented as a nested
optimization problem:
cqMin {f' q* I(f*, q*) =arg Max (z(f,q) = a- hq-(cs+ca(q))f-cpfq}} (p 2)
where F = {f: 91 - 9l I f f) = (q) < a Vq, and f is nondecreasing) is the set
of feasible punishment policies.
The internal maximization represents the user's problem of
maximizing utility subject to the punishment policy ca(q). The outer
minimization represents the policy maker's problem of choosing a
punishment policy that minimizes the rate of consumption, qf.
The derivation of the solution is more technical than the rest of
the paper, so readers may want to skip the introductory lemmas and
proceed directly to the theorem at the end of this section.
Setting the partial derivative of z(f,q) with respect to f equal to
zero
az(fq) = - (C + pca(q)+ cpq) = 0
If 2
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shows that
! 2 q*
f* = 4
(Cs + pc*(q*) + cpq*)2
Substituting this into z(f,q) = ctVf - hq - (cs + p ca(q)) f - cp f q implies that
z(fq*) = 4 (cs + p c(q*) +cpq*) - hq
Cs + pCa Cs + PCa
Lemma 1: q* Q = a2c cp a, the optimal quantity
when ca(q) = Ca for all q > 0.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that q* > Q. Since ca(q) = Ca is in the
set of feasible punishment policies
q'* _ a2 q*2 * at2  Q2F.
4 (Cs + P c(q*) +cpq*)2 4 (CS + P Ca +CpQ)2
Since ca(q) must also be feasible, c(q*) < Ca. So
a 2Q2 a2 Q2
4 (CS + p Ca +cpQ)2 4 (cs + p c*q*) +cpQ)2
which implies
q Q
CS + P (q*) +cpq CS +P C*(q*)+cpQ
Thus since cs + pca(q*) > 0 and cp > 0, q* Q. Contradiction. QED.
Lemma 2: There is an optimal punishment policy with ca(Q) = ca.
Proof: By Lemma 1, q* < Q. If q* = Q then c(Q) = Ca minimizes f*
and thus q*f*.
Suppose q* < Q and c*(q) is an optimal punishment policy with
c:*(Q) < Ca. Then the punishment policy
(q) = ca (q) < Q
Ca q>Q
yields the same solution as ca*(q) does because z(f, q; ca(q)) = z(f, q;
ca*(q)) for all q < Q and z(f, q; c(q)) < z(f, q; c*(q)) < z(f*, q*; c*(q*)) =
z(f*, q*; c(q)) for all q > Q. QED.
Lemma 3: There is an optimal punishment policy c(q) and quantity
q* such that c(q*) U(q*) where
1 a2 q cp
pU(q) =4 cs- cpq.
(2- h(cs + pCa)) + hqcp
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Proof: By Lemma 2 there exists an optimal punishment policy with
c~(Q) = Ca. Since (F,Q) is feasible for the user, z(f*, q*; c(q)) > z(F, Q;
Ca(q)) = z(F, Q; ca(q) = Ca), i.e.
·C2 q*
z(f*,q; ca(q)) = 4 (cs + p c(q*) +cpq*)
- h(Cs+ P ca))
- hq* C
Cp
Solving for pca(q*) gives the desired inequality. QED.
Theorem 1: Any punishment policy that satisfies the following
conditions will minimize consumption.
1) c(q) = 0 for 0 < q < q,
2) ca(q) > U(q) for q < q < Q, and
3) ca(q) = ca for q > Q
where
I (2 q cp
U(q) =1 4
P a- h (c)s + p hqcp
Q pCa _cs + Ppca Ca is th
2cp h Cp
when Ca q) = Ca. With any consumptio:
q c1 p Cs P a - + P Ca _ '-a
CpL2 h 2 2
- Cs - cp q and
e optimal purchase quantity
n minimizing policy:
P Ca + hat- 2Vhcs(p Ca))]hh 
a2
4(cs+cpq) 
= 2q 2
4 (s + cpq)2
aq , and2 (cs + cprq)
(c - ,/h (CS + P Ca))
zf, ; c(q)) = CP
Proof: Note that U(q) is an indifference curve for the user since z(f,
q; ca(q) = U(q)) = z(F, Q; ca(q) = Ca). It has the following properties: U(Q)
((qd = 0)) > 0, d (U(q Q d2 Uq)) < 0 so U(q) is increasing
= Ca, > O, dq= dq dq dq 2
for0O< q < Q. AlsoU(q) =0 for
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q = + 2cpa 2+ cCaap ca + h (Cs + P a)
Let - denote the smaller of the two zeros. Then
C cs+ -c + PCa pca + a - 2h (cs + Ca)
2 h 2 2 h -
and O < <Q.
Now Lemma 3 implies q* >2 ; otherwise, c*(q*) would be
negative. Think of the problem in the quantity-punishment plane.
The solution (q*, c(q*)) lies in the region bounded by q < q* < Q and
0 < c:(q*) < U(q*). Along the curve U(q*) for q < q* < Q,
q2q, - 4 !-~2q
' 2
qn f*-- = q 2
4(CI~p~q·)iedP -s+pUaq hcpq*)2
(_Jh- h(cS+pca))2+ hcpq*
This is strictly increasing in q*, so it is minimized along this curve by
taking q* = q.
Since
1 2q*
q, f* *
(Cs + pc*(q*)+ Cpq*)2
no point (q*, ca(q*)) in the region can be better than the
corresponding point (q*, U(q*)) on the curve U(q*). Hence, a policy
that forces q* = q is optimal, and any c(q) such that c;(q) = 0 for 0 < q
< q, C:(q) > U(q) for q < q < Q, and c*(Q) = ca for q > Q will do. Actually
the optimal policies will be perturbations of these policies that
ensure the user strictly prefers q = q to any larger q. QED.
U(q) is an indifference curve. It is the set of all points such
that when the user makes purchases of size q, the frequency of
purchase f is related to q by the necessary conditions for optimality,
and the expected punishment for possessing q is U(q), then the user's
utility is the same as it is at the best possible point under a
maximum punishment policy (i.e., q = Q and f = F when ca(q) = ca.).
In other words, the user is equally happy at any point along the
curve U(q).
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Figure 3 shows the general shape of U(q). It is positively
sloped for q < Q, concave, reaches a maximum of Ca at q = Q, and
equals zero for q = Q + P Ca + -2 h(cs+pca)).
smaller of these two zeros is and 0 < < Q.
The
Figure 3
The Indifference Curve U(q)
ca(q)
Ca
Q q
The theorem states that any punishment policy ca(q) that is
zero for quantities less than q, is at least as great as U(q) for q < q < Q,
and equals Ca for q > Q minimizes consumption. Note the
consumption minimizing policy is not unique because the value for 
< q < Q is not uniquely specified.
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Figure 4 shows one such policy. (The curves beneath U(q) are
also indifference curves; each represents a lower utility for the user.)
It coaxes the user to reduce q from Q to by reducing the
punishment for smaller quantities. Since the rate of consumption qf
is increasing in q, this also reduces consumption. As long as the
punishment ca(q) must be nonnegative though, there is a limit to
how much one can reduce consumption because U(q) < 0 for q < .
Figure 4
Indifference Curves and
A Consumption Minimizing Policy
ca(q)
Ca
Solu:on With A ConsurDtion
Mirnlmiznq Policy
It might appear that the consumption-minimizing policy is too
complicated to implement, but there is a class of policies that
minimize consumption, and not all of them are complicated. For
example, imposing no penalty for q < and the maximum penalty ca
for q > q minimizes consumption. Nevertheless, it may be that none
of these are politically feasible because they all impose no
punishment for possession of quantities up to the threshold quantity
j> 0.
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3.4 Consumption Minimizing Linear Policy
It has been shown that a maximum punishment policy does not
minimize consumption. The previous section described the policies
that do minimize consumption, but noted that they may not be
politically feasible because they impose no punishment for quantities
less than the threshold . This section finds the consumption
minimizing policy within a restricted class of policies that might
realistically be implemented.
One can only guess at the kinds of punishment policies that are
politically acceptable, but given public sentiment at the moment, one
restriction might be to consider only those policies that assign some
punishment for possession of any positive amount, no matter how
small l. Also, legislators might quite reasonably object if the
punishment were calculated by some complicated mathematical
expression that the public could not understand. This suggests
restricting attention to linear punishment policies. Then legislators
would just have to specify the minimum punishment, the maximum
punishment, and the smallest quantity that merits the maximum
punishment, and then draw a straight line connecting these points.
Figure 5 shows a typical linear punishment policy.
Figure 5
A Typical Linear Punishment Policy
Ca(q)
Ca
a
0+ ca -a q
b
1This sentiment is reflected in the words of the recently released National
Drug Control Strategy, "we need a national enforcment strategy that casts a
wide net and seeks to ensure that all drug use -- whatever its scale -- faces the
risk of criminal sanction.", (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, September, 1989), p.18.
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Mathematically the problem is the same as the one in the
previous section except the punishment policy must be selected from
a smaller set. Specifically, it is
a(q) q* (f* q*) = arg Max (z(f,q)
CaM ) G If,q O
= af-q - hq - (cs + p ca(q)) f f- p fq (P 3)
g: - I g(), g() = a bq with a,b for < q <a - ag(q) = a bqwithforq > Ca - a
Theorem 2 gives the solution. The superscript A is used to
denote the optimal quantities for this problem. Again, the proof is
rather technical and can be skipped.
Theorem 2. If a < 2h(cs + p ca) then se
qj=f=o
If a > 2h(cs + pca) the consumption
intercept of 0 and slope
cp Huh (cs + p a) - S) - h pca
2 which give+ p a)
which gives
etting ca(q) = Ca gives
minimizing policy has an
(-a - /h(cs + pCa)
A=¥ ( h(Cs+Pca) 2f -2P
(2 - Fh cCP
A=
, and
z(f, q; ca(q) = b*q) =
Proof: If a < 2h(cs + pca)
- h (cs + P Ca))
Cp
then setting ca(q) = Ca for all q > 0 is
optimal because it yields the trivial solution.
Suppose a > 2 h(cs + Ca). It is difficult to solve
directly, but if the feasible set G is replaced by
G2 = g: 9 ---> I g(O) = 0, g(q) = a + bq with a,b > 0 for q > 0)
over G
Page 23
9h 1
h'Cs
-
G =
then the Appendix gives the solution to the inner optimization
problem in closed form. This can be taken advantage of by solving
the problem with G = G2 subject to the additional constraint that the
user's utility must be at least as great as that obtained when ca(q) =
ca. For convenience, that value will be denoted by iK. Thus,
(2-Vh(cs + p Ca)
z(f*, q*, ca(q) = a + bq) > z(F, Q, ca(q) = Ca) = = K.CP
This constraint eliminates all solutions admitted when G = G2
that should not be allowed since, if the solution has a + bq* > ca, then
z(f*, q*, ca(q) = a + bq) < z(f*, q*, ca(q) = Ca) < z(F, Q, ca(q) = ca). Hence
the problem reduces to
( - h (cs + a))2
subject to ga,b) = - 0.Cp + p b
If a > 2 h (cs + p a) the objective function is decreasing in
both a and b and g(a,b) is increasing. This means the solution will
satisfy the inequality as an equality and thus the problem reduces to
Min K
a,b>0 cp + pb
subject to b( a) = p c (h c + pca - h( s + pa)) + hp(a - Ca)
2 - rh(cs + Ppa))2
Since the objective function is decreasing in b and da
a > 2 h (cs + p a), the optimal linear policy is to choose
a* = 0 and
b* c (csp a ph(cs + pc ) - s)- hpca
(2- -/h((cs +P Ca)) 2
Page 24
Note, b* > ca/Q, so the optimal linear policy has a steeper slope than
the proportional policy considered above, and thus a* + b*Q = b*Q >
Ca. (See Figure 6.)
Substituting these values of a* and b* into the expressions in
Section 2.2 gives the desired result. QED.
Figure 6
The Consumption Minimizing Linear Policy
ca(q)
Ca
?Q4 q
The expression for the optimal slope is complicated, but some
algebraic manipulation shows it is greater than ca/Q, and so it is
steeper than the slope of the linear policy considered in Section 3.2.
(See Figure 6.)
Note the consumption minimizing policy's intercept is zero. It
imposes the lightest possible sanctions for possession of trace
amounts. This is consistent with the previous section's finding that
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the overall consumption minimizing policy calls for no punishment
whatsoever for amounts up to some positive threshold.
Looking at Figure 6 shows why this is so. The policy maker
must pick a straight line connecting the vertical axis with the
horizontal line ca(q) = ca. The new equilibrium point will be at the
place where this line is tangent to an indifference curve, either U(q)
or one below U(q). The new equilibrium point will be farthest to the
left (yielding the lowest consumption) if the line is tangent to U(q)
itself and the slope is as steep as possible. This is accomplished by
making the line's vertical intercept zero.
3.5 Policy of Not Punishing Users
Before comparing the policies discussed above, it is useful to
consider what would happen if users were not punished, i.e. if ca(q) =
O for all q. Note, this is not a model of legalization because the
search cost and price would almost certainly fall substantially if the
drug were made legal. It is closer to a "decriminalization" policy that
leaves antidrug laws on the books, but does not enforce them against
users.
The solution can be obtained directly from the expression in
Section 2.2 because this is the special case of Problem P1 with a = b =
0. Italics are used to denote optimal values when there is no
punishment. If a < 2 hcs,
q =f= 0,
but if a > 2 hc the soluton is
2 h cp
f (=xV h h 12=h c s h' Cp
qf = , and
z(f, q; ca(q)= ) = 2 Cp
4.0 Discussion
It is assumed here that the objective is to minimize
consumption, so in this section the adjective "optimal" is used in
place of the term "consumption minimizing".
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4.1 Comparison of Policies
The five policies considered above are compared below. Table
1 reviews the notation used for each policy.
Table 1
Summary of Notation Used for Different Policies
Capital Q Section 3.1: Maximum Punishment ca(q) = Ca
Ca
Tilda q Section 3.2: First Linear Policy ca(q) = Q q 0 q Q
ca(q) > Ca q Q
Bar q Section 3.3: Optimal Policy ca(q) = 0 0 < q < q
ca(q) = Ca q 
Hat q Section 3.4: Optimal Linear Policy ca(q) = b* q 0 < q b*
Ca
ca(q)= Ca q b*
Italics q Section 3.5: No Punishment ca(q) = 0
If a < 2/h(cs + p Ca) the optimal linear policy, overall optimal
policy, and maximum punishment policy all give the same solution,
so for purposes of comparison, it is assumed that a > 2/h(cs + p Ca).
Some tedious algebra allows one to rank the policies in terms of
their ability to reduce consumption.
1) Optimal Policy
2) Optimal Linear Policy
3) First Linear Policy
4) No Punishment
5) Maximum Punishment
The ranking for the purchase size, q, and the frequency of
purchase, f, depends on the parameter values. Specifically, if >
2h(Cs + p + C) then in order of increasing purchase size the
ranking is
1) Optimal Policy
2) Optimal Linear Policy
3) First Linear Policy
4) No Punishment
5) Maximum Punishment
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and in order of increasing purchase frequency it is
1) Maximum Punishment
2) Optimal Linear Policy
3) First Linear Policy
4) No Punishment.
If a < 2-(cs + PC + a  ), however, then in order of increasing
purchase size the ranking is
1) Optimal Policy
2) Optimal Linear Policy
3) First Linear Policy
4) Maximum Punishment
5) No Punishment
and order of increasing purchase frequency it is
1) Optimal Linear Policy
2) Maximum Punishment
3) First Linear Policy
4) No Punishment
The user's utility at equilibrium can be similarly ranked in
decreasing order:
1) No Punishment
2) First Linear Policy
3) Maximum Punishment (3 way tie)
Optimal Policy
Optimal Linear Policy.
Figures 7 and 8 on the following pages show these comparisons
graphically. When two quantities appear to be equal in the figures it
indicates that their relative size depends on the parameter values.
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Figure 7
Comparison of Five Punishment Policies
Solution When There
Is No Punishment
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ca(q
Comparison of
Figure 8
Policies in the q-f Plane
ff
F
f
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4.2 Potential for Reducing Consumption by Changing Policy
Simply signing quantities is not always very helpful. For
example, Figure 8 shows that switching from a maximum
punishment policy to the optimal linear policy will reduce
consumption, but by how much? A 50% reduction might justify
overcoming political and bureaucratic obstacles that a 5% reduction
might not.
In general it is difficult to do more than determine relative
magnitudes because the parameter values are not known, but some
algebra shows that
qf QF
QF qf
That is, the ratio of consumption under the optimal linear
policy to that under a maximum punishment policy is the same as
the ratio of consumption under maximum punishment to
consumption with no punishment. Thus, one can (theoretically)
achieve the same percentage reduction in consumption going from a
maximum punishment policy to a proportional punishment policy as
one can going from no punishment to maximum punishment!
The United States essentially has a maximum punishment
policy. While penalties may increase with quantity, generally the
upper limit of the lowest punishment category is more than is
usually held for personal consumption1. Thus, the punishment facing
an individual user is essentially independent of quantity 2. (Actually
there may be some quantity dependence because larger quantities
may encourage police to collect evidence more carefully and the
district attorney to prosecute more vigorously, but this effect is
probably relatively minor.)
Also, most people concede that there is at least a reasonable
chance that consumption would increase appreciably if users were
not threatened with punishment. This paper suggests that if that is
the case, one could hope for further appreciable reductions by
reforming laws to make punishment proportional to the quantity
possessed. Such a reform would be in keeping with the national drug
strategy which states that "Punishment should be flexible -- let the
penalty fit the nature of the crime." 3
1Controlled Substances Act, Chapter 13, Subchapter I, Part D, Section 841.
2Tracy Thompson's "Can Justice Be A Little Too Blind?" (The Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, September 4-10, 1989, pp.31-32) gives examples when
stiff mandatory penalties have been imposed on people who might have been
treated more leniently until recently.
3 National Drug Control Strategy, p.19.
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There are at least two significant qualifications to this
conclusion, however. They are discussed in the next section.
4.3 Qualifications to the Conclusion Above
The discussion above is based on the observation that
qf _ QF
QF qf
However, the fact that the ratios are exactly equal depends on the
assumption that the satisfaction derived from using increases as the
square root of the quantity consumed, and clearly that is somewhat
of an arbitrary assumption. One would expect the function to be
concave because of diminishing returns, but its exact form is
unknown and unlikely to be so simple. It is quite possible, however,
that the basic conclusion is more robust than the exact equality of
the ratios. That conclusion is that if moving from no punishment to
maximum punishment can significantly reduce consumption, it is
likely that moving to a proportional policy will lead to further
significant reductions.
The second and more serious qualification is that the slope of
the optimal linear policy depends on the individual user's utility
parameters. It is difficult to imagine how one might measure the
utility parameters accurately enough to quantitatively compute the
optimal slope. Furthermore, the optimal slope varies from individual
to individual.
The problem with not knowing the users' utility parameters is
most easily illustrated by considering an attempt to implement a
policy of no punishment when q < q and maximum punishment if q >
q. Since q is unknown, the policy would actually be
Ca(q) = 0 0 < q < x
ca(q) = Ca q x
where x is some estimate of q. Figure 9 shows how the resulting
purchase size depends on x. If x < (the government underestimates
q), the purchase size and rate of consumption will be the same as
they would be under a policy of maximum punishment. If x = the
new policy will work as desired. As x increases beyond t ( he
government overestimates q), the purchase size increases linearly.
Solving for the optimal frequency, one finds that for q< x < q,
q=2(cs + p )
so the rate of consumption rises with x until x = q. At that point,
consumption levels off at qf, the rate of consumption when there is
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Figure 9
Purchase Size As a
Function of Permitted Quantity
q*(x)
-q
Q
q
q X
no punishment. That rate may be significantly higher than the
original rate QF.
Hence, if the government overestimates q, changing the
punishment policy will have no effect on consumption, and if it
underestimates badly enough, consumption might actually increase!
Attempting to implement the optimal linear punishment policy
poses a similar dilemma. If the slope is too steep, changing from a
policy of maximum punishment will have no effect, but if the slope is
too shallow changing the punishment policy may increase rather
than decrease consumption.
4.4 Further Work
This section discusses some possible directions for further
work. The first follows from the preceding discussion. Since the
user's utility parameters are not known, a sensitivity analysis would
be desirable. One could postulate a probability density function for
the utility parameters and try to find a policy that minimizes the
expected rate of consumption. If the probability density function
represented the empirical distribution of parameters across the
entire population, then the resulting policy would minimize
aggregate consumption.
It is difficult to predict the results of such an analysis. One
may discover that the optimal policy is insensitive to certain
parameters. At the other extreme, uncertainty about the parameters
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might favor maintaining a maximum punishment policy that avoids
the risk of inadvertently increasing consumption in the manner
discussed above.
Viewing the probability density function as the statistical
distribution of users' parameters suggests considering objectives
other than minimizing consumption. For example, policy makers
might not be indifferent between having a heavy user increase
consumption by two units per day and having two non-users begin
using one unit per day.
Other directions for additional work include assessing the
sensitivity of the model as a whole to certain of its assumptions. For
example, what happens if the satisfaction derived from using does
not grow as the square root of the quantity consumed or the
probability of arrest per purchase is not independent of the
frequency of purchase? Similarly, one could ask about the effects of
quantity discounts. Changes of this nature jeopardize the model's
analytical tractability, so much of the evaluation would probably be
numerical. But it would be valuable to know if the main conclusion
about the potential for proportional punishment to reduce
consumption continues to hold.
Finally, the model currently assumes search time costs, the
probability of arrest, and price are all fixed constants. Although
policy makers do not set these parameters directly, they clearly are
not exogenous constants. Interesting optimization questions can be
posed by assuming policy makers can affect these parameters
(within limits) at some cost.
4.5 Limitations of the Model
The model discussed in this paper completely ignores several
important issues. Perhaps foremost among these are questions about
substitution between different kinds of drugs, both licit and illicit. A
classic example of this is the possibility that clamping down on
marijuana might lead to increased use of potentially more dangerous
substances such as cocaine. Less direct substitution effects may exist
as well. For example, severe punishment for possession of heroin
may have enhanced the popularity of cocaine, and widespread use of
cocaine may now be fueling demand for heroin for "speedballing" 1.
The current model says nothing about coordinating punishment
policies for different drugs.
The model is also static. A variety of parameters may change
over time. In particular, the model does not keep track of the
1
"Speedballing" is the slang term for using heroin and cocaine together.
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individual's arrest history even though punishment (and perception
of punishment) generally depend on past arrests. Hence, the model
cannot even consider questions about special policies for repeat
offenders.
Finally, the model uses point estimates for q and f. Clearly
consumption is not perfectly regular. But allowing for some
distribution of purchase quantities and inter-purchase intervals
would probably make the analysis much more complicated without
producing significant insight. Nevertheless, it is important to
remember that this simplification has been made.
5.0 Summary
This paper argues that a "zero tolerance" policy of imposing a
maximum level of punishment irrespective of the quantity possessed
may not minimize consumption. Switching from such a policy to one
in which punishment is proportional to quantity could increase some
users' welfare while simultaneously bringing reductions in
consumption comparable to those achieved by moving from no
punishment to a policy of maximum punishment.
However, for a variety of reasons the model is not suitable for
quantitatively computing the optimal punishment policy. First of all,
the model makes many assumptions, for example that search time
costs and the probability of arrest per purchase are independent of
the frequency of purchase, that may not hold exactly. It also ignores
important issues such as substitution between drugs, the treatment
of repeat offenders, and the ability of policy makers to control
parameters such as price, search time costs, and the probability of
arrest. Most significantly though, the policies prescribed are
functions of the user's utility parameters. These parameters cannot
be measured, and even if they could be, they vary from user to user.
These points, however, do not negate the paper's principal
conclusion that a "zero tolerance" policy for users may not minimize
consumption. There are other compelling reasons for not following a
"zero tolerance" policy. It commits scarce enforcement resources to
relatively minor offenders, crowds courts and prisons, and violates
the principle that "the punishment should fit the crime".
Nevertheless, perhaps in response to calls to "get tough" on drugs, the
United States currently has essentially a "zero tolerance" policy for
users. This paper suggests that the desire to be "tough on drugs", at
least in as much as that represents a desire to minimize consumption,
should not preclude consideration of a policy that makes punishment
proportional to the quantity possessed.
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Appendix
The general form of this problem is
Max z(f,q) = a - -q f fq
s.t. q,f > O.
The first order conditions ar
az(f,q)
Vz(f,q) = z(f,q)
qThe Hessian
The Hessian
V 2 z(f,q) = [ -1 1-qf-2 6 [2 q 8 - ] - 8 ]2 Qq r 6- -14q2 --a
is negative definite because its first principal minor is less than zero,
P1l -1l 0
and its second principal minor
P2( 4= -- ) - > 4 VqfT 4 Tj >
is positive. Hence, z(f,q) is concave, and solving the first order
conditions gives the unique global maximum at
q* = a / 
f* = q*= 2 _ 
7 28 7 5
If a < 2y these expressions are negative so
*= f* = q* = 0,
but if a > 2p, q* and f* yield a nontrivial solution with
q f = (2 * and
z(f*, q*) = q* f* = 2 /5
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